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Jarosław Kaczyński is in a sense Orbán's ideological pupil. It seems as if many Hungarian practices are being "copy-paste" implemented in Poland. The aim of this article is to analyse how and to what extent the various reforms of Orbán's government are a matrix for the illiberal shift in Poland. The author argues that just as Poland and Hungary shared know-how and experience throughout the transition to the market and liberal democracy, now we can observe the same Hungarian / Polish cooperation in illiberal politics. Beata Szydło's government is fully benefiting from "Fidesz's revolution", which has been taking place in Hungary since 2010 and whose aim it is to retain power not only via elections, but also by influencing the law, consciousness and language. shows the state of the Hungarian economy at that time (Real GDP growth rate -volume).
As a result of growing frustration with the government of socialist and liberals at that time, Fidesz was able to make its way not only to autonomous governing, but it also gained a constitutional majority in 2010. The above-mentioned coincidence of events gave Viktor
Orbán an unprecedented chance for a revolutionary change in Hungarian politics. It is worth mentioning that Fidesz was the main power curbing the market reforms of Gyurcsány's government. The party successfully conducted a referendum against the commercialization of higher education and the introduction of fees for medical care. Fidesz became the main party representing the interest of the common Hungarian and giving him and her political subjectivity. Besides the changes to the Constitutional Tribunal, the government of Viktor Orbán has also made fundamental changes in the media law. The newly created Council of the National Media can administer fines to print and online publishers and broadcasters whose materials the Council considers biased and unbalanced (Spence, 2016) . This body also has the right to demand that journalists disclose their sources of information. The new National Media and Infocommunications Authority was filled with Fidesz loyalists who received longterm appointments. As a result of the creation of the Hungarian Media Service Support and Asset Management Fund, which gathers all public media, they have been centralized and the public television, radio and press agency have all become transmitters of government communiques (Sadecki, 2014) . There have been mass lay-offs of left-wing journalists.
Recipe for the "Hungarian Illiberal Goulash"
An important aspect of the above-mentioned reforms is that Orbán's government organizes advertisement campaigns called "government information" via media, both public and private (as they are financed by state advertisements). The slogans promoted during such actions over the last years have included: "We won't yield to the IMF" (against the conditions of the IMF regarding financial support for Hungary), "Hungary is performing "Consequently, what is happening today in Hungary can be interpreted as an attempt of the respective political leadership to harmonize the relationship between the interests and achievement of individuals -which need to be acknowledged -with interests and achievements of the community, and the nation. Meaning that the Hungarian nation is not a simple sum of individuals, but a community that needs to be organized, strengthened and developed, and in this sense, the new state that we are building is an illiberal state, a non- However, the use of language generating fear of Islam has a strictly illiberal character. As Dominik Héjj points out, the division into "us" and "them" used by Orbán also has a quasireligious character: "Christianity has become one of the key state-building elements in Hungary, along with culture and language. In this context, the influx of immigrants -largely Muslim -is unequivocally interpreted as a threat to the existence of the state" (Héjj, 2015) .
Orbán used in Central Europe a well-known symbol of the "Bulwark of Christianity", which
constitutes an important element of the regional identity. In a sense, he wanted to prove that in the refugee crisis Hungary was once again taking part in a historical "clash of civilizations" and to argue that as a special nation it has to withstand not only attacks from outside of Europe, but also from the inside, as it was being accused of lack of solidarity with refugees from war-torn Syria. The symbolic power to save the Hungarian nation from the "lethal danger" became a powerful weapon used by Orbán in order to consolidate support for his country. Seemingly, Hungarian illiberalism has not only an ideological character, but also a very pragmatic dimension.
"We will have Budapest in Warsaw"
"Ladies and Gentlemen, I am fully convinced that there will be a day when we will manage, when we will have Budapest in Warsaw" -it is with these words that Jarosław Kaczyński addressed the electorate of his Law and Justice (PiS) party after they lost the It took place a few months after the elections in Poland, in Niedzica, a city that before 1918 belonged to Hungary but is now a part of Poland. Since then, both the two leaders and other politicians from Fidesz and Law and Justice have been meeting regularly. It remains unknown how much these meetings are a reflection of friendship between the politicians and how much they are aimed at sharing and receiving "instructions".
"Opinions of the Constitutional Tribunal (…) are final"?
One of the Law and Justice government's first controversial acts stemmed from a conflict with the Constitutional Tribunal, an institution regarded as fundamental in Poland's judiciary system. The problems began a few weeks before the elections with a rapid and -as it was later proven, un-constitutional -election of two out of five judges of the Tribunal during the final weeks of the coalition government of the Civic Platform (PO) and the Polish In contrast to the situation in Hungary, Law and Justice does not have the constitutional majority, which means it cannot formally change the constitution as did the government of Viktor Orbán. Taking this into account, Jarosław Kaczynski decided to paralyze the institution of the Constitutional Tribunal and take it over. One of the effects of the status quo is the total lack of constitutional control over adopted legal acts. In a sense, the Law and Justice conducts heavily antidemocratic policies, which are characterized not only by the lack of respect towards the law, but also an absolute immunity in regards to any arguments and comments from the parliamentary and non-parliamentary opposition.
Therefore, Poland is now in the same situation as Hungary. The laws adopted in Poland are a result of one-party decisions, serving the ruling party ad-hoc for its populist policies.
A second example of institutional change to serve partisan ends is the new media law in Poland. Following the footsteps of Hungary, the public television, radio and press agency were consolidated into one institution of national media. As it was the case in Hungary, a Council for National Media was created, which is to be elected by parliament and the On-line Journal Modelling the New Europe Issue no. 26/2018 103 president. In this way, the constitutional competence of the National Council for Radio and Television, an institution whose role is to safeguard the freedom of speech, was limited. The Council for National Media has been filled with ruling party politicians, which is evidence of the party-loyalist character of this institution. The mission of the national media, as laid down by the law, is also characteristic. Namely, it is said that the role of the media is "to cultivate national traditions as well as patriotic and humanistic values, contributing to the spiritual well-being of media listeners and viewers"; also, the media shall "respect the Christian value system, based on the universal rules of ethics" (Nowa ustawa medialna: TVP, PR i PAP będą mediami narodowymi). Like in Hungary, many journalists working for the public media have been made redundant. The main information services became an easy transmitter of progovernment content. In the opinion of the media scientists Maciej Mrozowski and Tatiana Popadiak-Kuligowska, the main information service of the national media does not fulfil its duties as a public broadcaster in the field of political neutrality and pluralism (Mrozowski and Popadiak-Kuligowska, 2016) . Both in Poland and in Hungary, government-friendly private media receive generous financial support from public advertisements and several public institutions.
The national media are also the main tool to raise the public's fear of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa. Journalists purposefully use the term "immigrants" instead of "refugees" to give the impression that people fleeing from the war in Syria are really motivated by financial motives to come to Europe. Additionally, representatives of the Polish government and public media use the adjective "illegal" pointing out the unlawful character of the migrants' stay. After the terrorist acts in Berlin on December 19 th 2016, the terms "immigrant" and "terrorist" have been used by the media interchangeably. The impact of this message was strengthened by the fact that the first victim of the attack was the Polish driver whose truck had been stolen and used in the killing. After another terrorist attack in
Manchester on May 22, 2017, Prime Minister Beata Szydło made a comment that clearly linked the tragedy with the refugee crisis: "we will not participate in this madness of the Brussels' elites. We want to help people, and not the political elites. And I repeat: we are helping and we will continue to do so, but our help will be directed to those who need it and are waiting there, on the spot. The Polish Border Guards are engaged in securing the external borders of the European Union. We are engaged in international projects. All services which 
Putinisation of Central Europe?
The official approach towards the Russian Federation is fundamentally different in Poland and Hungary. Poland has many historical issues with Russia and contradictory foreign policy interests. Not being Russia's neighbour, Hungary can afford a more pragmatic approach to the Kremlin. Cheap gas and the promise of Russian assistance with the modernization of the nuclear power plant in Paks define at least a wiling attitude of Viktor
Orbán towards Vladimir Putin. Despite visible differences between Poland and Hungary towards the Russian regime, one should take note of how the Central-European illiberal shift resembles the politics conducted by the political elites of the Kremlin. Russian conservatism, similar to Orbán's illiberalism, draws a stark contrast between national identity and the multiculturalism of the West; it juxtaposes "illiberal democracy" to liberal democracy, and opposes social conservatism to hedonism, Christianity to atheism. This strong ideological project is followed by a strong pull of democratic reins and the questioning of a number of rules of the state of law. and liberalism, the rise of 'organized intolerance' increasing demands for direct democracy, and the proliferation of charismatic leaders capable of mobilizing public anger make it almost impossible to avoid drawing parallels between the current political turmoil in Central Europe and the crisis of democracy in Europe between the world wars" (Krastev, 2007) . Ten years later, however, it turns out that the world can look much worse.
The experience of the global financial crisis of 2008, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the refugee crisis, the divisions within the European Union, the rise of social inequalities, the increasing fragility of the labour market and ongoing structural unemployment are contributing to the popularity of isolationistic tendencies throughout Europe and the West. Questioning the separation of powers, rule of law, nonpartisan media and administration turned into a textbook for the Polish government. Kaczyński and Orbán, hand in hand, are using xenophobic and nationalistic arguments in their internal and external politics. Together, they are questioning the sense of European solidarity, treating the European Union as a source of additional income. 
